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Viability of a Stable West African Monetary Union 
Abdullahi Zakari Yahaya1 
Louis Sevitenyi Nkwatoh2C 
Abstract 
There is apparently non-sychronization of business cycles in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This 
may likely threaten the effectiveness of the monetary union. This 
study investigated the viability of a stable West African monetary 
union in the ECOWAS region. The study used the Ghosh-Wolf 
output loss function after de-trending the annual growth rates of 
real GDP from 1975 to 2015, using Baxter-King filter approach. 
The results indicate that smaller economies in the region (Cape 
Verde, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Mali) will compromise the 
stability of the union because their cost of pursuing a common 
stabilization policy will be very high, while larger economies 
(Nigeria and Ghana) will incur relatively low cost compared to 
the other groups. Also, the output losses of WAEMU economies 
fall within a particular range and are relatively lower compared 
to that of smaller economies in the region probably because they 
pursue a common stabilization policy. The implication of these 
findings is that the stability of the envisaged West African 
monetary union is likely to be compromised since smaller 
economies in the region will be worse-off than larger economies. 
Thus, in order not to compromise the stability, smaller economies 
should not be admitted at the initial stage of the union until they 
satisfy all the criteria.  
Keywords: ECOWAS, Ghosh-Wolf output loss function monetary 
union, optimal currency area, stability. 
JEL Clasifications: E52,  F33, F36, C12, C32 
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1. Introduction 
The stability of a monetary union is incumbent on a set of 
macroeconomic convergence criteria (otherwise known as entry 
requirements) that must ensure an optimal policy for member 
countries. Correlation and synchronization of macroeocnomic 
shocks necessitate a robust monetary union which safeguards other 
member countries from individual harmful shocks (Jekins & 
Thomas, 1996) and enhances fiscal discipline (Cham, 2009). 
The stability of the union accentuated in the New Optimum 
Currency Area (NOCA) theory focuses on synchronicity of business 
cycles of intending member countries. Business cycles according to 
Krugman (1993) create a good precondition for policy integration 
as well as the creation of a currency area. Fielding and Shields 
(2001) and Njoroge, Opolot, Abuka and Appa-Okello (2011) argued 
that policy coordination and harmonization are observable if 
business cycles are similar, and when shocks are symmetric among 
member countries. Implicitly, stability is guaranteed if the 
synchronicity of business cycles of member countries portends 
ample benefits for the entire union. 
The synchronicity of business cycles as a requisite condition 
for a stable monetary union is predicated on the coexistence of 
weaker and stronger economies in a monetary union. This view 
articulated within the premise of the neo-classical growth theory 
emphasizes that weaker economies (low income) in a given sample 
will eventually catch-up with stronger economies (high-income) 
since weaker economies have every tendency to replicate production 
methods, technologies, institutions and economic activities of 
stronger economies (Fuente, 2000; Jenkins & Thomas, 1996; 
Rassekh & Thompson, 1993). Hence, countries with non-
synchronous business cycles may disturb the monetary union, and 
can, therefore threaten the union’s stability. This postulation is 
reinforced by Mink, Janp and Jakob (2007) who exemplified in their 
study that the instability in the Euro zone is due partly to the diverse 
national business cycles of Euro member countries. 
 ECOWAS countries are committed to forming a wider and 
stable monetary union between West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ - Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra 
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Leone) and the West African Economic Monetary Union 
(WAEMU- Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo) by 2020. Yet, the business cycles across the 
entire region remain weak and non-synchronous as opined by the 
Central Bank Governor of Nigeria cited in Uche (2016). Moreover, 
ECOWAS economies neither grow nor recess at the same time, 
which underscores the non-synchronicity of their business cycles. 
USAID Report (2012) shows that, Ghana’s real GDP growth was 
expected to hit double-digits in 2011 and 2012; Nigeria's real GDP 
growth rates were expected to be approximately 6–8 percent 
between 2009 and 2012. In like manner, Burkina Faso and Sierra 
Leone accelerated their growth rates in 2010 and 2011. While, the 
political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire contracted its real GDP by 7 percent 
in 2011, Cape Verde's economy was intensely effected by the global 
financial crisis.  
A major implication of the non-synchronicity of ECOWAS 
business cycles is that the policy conflicts emanating from the 
diverse economic structures of member countries may likely 
threaten the stability of the envisaged monetary union. For instance, 
larger economies like Nigeria, Ghana etc., can decide to thwart 
policy objectives of the entire union to meet their domestic targets. 
Thus, the objective of this study is to investigate the viability, of a 
stable West African monetary union. 
2. Empirical and Theoretical Review 
2.1.  Theoretical Issues 
According to the traditional optimum currency area (TOCA) theory, 
similarity in shocks is a requisite for setting up a monetary union 
because the cost of forfeiting monetary autonomy becomes lesser 
when the shocks among candidate economies are identical. 
Conversely, the new optimum currency area (NOCA) theory which 
is more forward looking considers that the requisite condition 
emphasized in the TOCA is strengthened and attainable only after 
the monetary union is formed. The NOCA theory is an extension of 
the TOCA theory, introduced by Frankel and Rose (1998) states 
that, member countries with higher trade volume are more integrated 
within monetary union if their business cycles are synchronous. 
Lending credence to Frankel and Rose’s conjecture, De Grauwe 
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(1997) submits that the national business cycles of Euro members 
became more synchronized with higher trade integration. This 
argument buttresses an earlier submission advanced by Krugman 
(1993) that increased economic integration leads to higher 
information flow and specialization, which in turn leads to regional 
concentration of industrial activities. By implication, more benefits 
are derived from a monetary union when members become 
integrated. 
Inferences on monetary union stability have been 
exemplified in the real convergence hypothesis approach, which 
considers, diffusion of technology, capital-labour mobility and 
globalization as key requirements to further strengthen a monetary 
union. The focal point of the convergence hypothesis resides on the 
tendency for developing economies to outpace developed 
economies. Because in the process of growth, both economies attain 
similar growth patterns that guarantee the stability of 
macroeconomic variables. Thus, similarities in the level of 
development ensure that the benefits of regional economic 
integration are realized more evenly among the member countries 
(McCarthy, 2002). 
A crucial assumption of the neoclassical growth model is 
that if all economies attain similar steady state of labour 
productivity, then the only difference across countries lies in their 
initial capital stock which makes capital deficient economies to 
accelerate growth because they are away from their steady state. 
Consequently, poor economies would eventually “catch-up” with 
rich economies (Jenkins & Thomas, 1996; Rassekh & Thompson, 
1993). Reason being that, there will be a flow of capital from rich to 
poorer economies which will enable them to accelerate growth than 
rich economies (Solow, 1956; Rassekh & Thompson, 1993; Kim, 
1998). In the same process, technology and low wages will be 
moved from more advanced economies to less advanced economies 
that will allow the latter to outpace the former. This implies that, less 
advanced economies that were initially more technologically-
backwards tend to “catch-up” faster with advanced economies if 
they were to embrace new technology (Abramovitz, 1986). Nindi 
(2012) inferred from Ohlin’s model that countries producing 
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homogenous goods, using the similar technology and facing price 
competition would end up with equalization in their factor prices. 
Consequently, weaker economies have an excellent opportunity to 
catch-up with rich ones by adopting and adapting modern 
technology (Dowrick & Delong, 2003). 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin Factor Price Equalisation 
theorem, movement of factors across a region will force factor 
prices to converge, thereby causing poor economies to catch-up with 
rich ones (Kwok & Lai, 2009). Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that 
globalization has indeed promoted growth and integration only for 
countries that allow free goods and capital mobiliy. 
A synopsis of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
model, illustrates that trade between trading regions will cause 
factor prices of these regions to converge even in the absence of 
perfect factor mobility. Kim (1998) and Bajona and Kehoe (2010) 
note that free trade in commodities causes the relative prices of 
commodities for trading partners to equalize, which in turn causes 
factor prices and national incomes to equalize. 
Thus, transfer of technology, capital-labour mobility and 
globalization can guarantee the stability of a monetary union since 
it will leverage weaker economies to catch up with stronger 
economies after a union is formed. 
2.2. Empirical Literature Review 
A more plausible approach that analyzes the stability of a monetary 
union and does not rely on any inference is the use of the output-
profit loss function. The output function is a genetic optimization 
algorithm adapted from Ghosh and Wolf (1994) which requires the 
use of the VAR estimates when analysing the degree of shock 
symmetry among monetary union members. Cheung and Yuen 
(2005) and  Sato and Zhang (2006) are the first to use this approach 
in the case of China alongside (Ellyne & Veller, 2011) for SSA. 
Cheung and Yuen (2005) used the output loss estimates to 
evaluate the cost of adopting a common currency in Asia. Using 
seasonally adjusted per capita GDP of China, Japan, and Korea from 
1993 to 2001, they concluded that the different policy targets of each 
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country would make the Asian zone unstable. Contrarily, Sato and 
Zhang (2006) employed the Kalman filter approach on GDP per 
capita from 1985 to 2003. Their findings showed that the Asian 
Zone would be relatively stable if they surrender their monetary 
autonomy. Replicating the aforementioned methodology, Veller and 
Veller and Ellyne (2011) minimized the total output loss for the 
entire Sub Saharan Africa to ascertain the viability of a common 
currency for the entire region. Her findings suggest that the three 
regional currency areas would be better off than when a common 
currency is adopted for the entire Sub Saharan Africa. 
Fiscal cooperation can guarantee a stable monetary union as 
well as the harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies of member 
countries. Bovenberg, Kremers and Masson (1991) submitted that 
conflicts between national fiscal authorities and the European 
Central Bank arise because macroeconomic instruments often adjust 
to stabilize governments’ debts in the Euro zone. Piffanelli (2001) 
established that some form of fiscal coordination is required for 
equilibria in which monetary policy alone is unable to secure price 
stability. He affirmed his position by using a standard general 
equilibrium model representing a monetary union with two 
countries featuring monopolistic competition and price rigidity. 
Tabellini (1986) arrived at the same results after formulating a 
differential game on government debt stabilization between the 
fiscal and monetary authorities in a closed economy. Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1995) also showed that fiscal and monetary 
coordination in a currency union reduces inflation, taxes and public 
spending, which in turn increases the welfare of union members.  
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) explored the effect of 
monetary and fiscal policy conflicts on macroeconomic outcomes in 
a monetary union. They concluded that the cost–benefit tradeoff of 
unification differs substantially between developed and less-
developed countries, hence, the scope of the unification may be 
dominated by seigniorage revenues. 
3. Methodology 
Two steps are employed in this study: 1. De-trending the GDP 
growth rate using Baxter-King (BK-1999) filter approach and 2. 
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Employing the Ghosh-Wolf (1994) output loss function. The BK 
filter is used to isolate trend components from the annual growth 
rate of real GDP series. First, a range of duration is chosen based on 
economic theory and prior assumptions about the duration of 
business cycles. For instance, suppose that the business cycle lasts 
somewhere between 1.5 and 8, then the lower band is set at 1.5 years 
and the upper band at 8 years. In doing so, the low frequency is 
removed and the high frequency of the cyclical components are 
filtered (Eviews Help Menu, Version 9.5). Secondly, the BK filter 
provides three sub-component of data series. These are time trend, 
cycles around trend and random movement: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                 (𝟏) 
Where 𝜏𝑡 is the time trend; 𝑐𝑡 is the cyclical component and, 
𝜀𝑡 is the irregular component (Baxter & King, 1999). 
From the equation above, a finite symmetric moving average 
is applied to extract the cyclical components from the time series 
and a new time series 𝑦𝑡
∗ is generated. 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=−𝐾
                                                                                (𝟐) 
Where 𝐾, is the maximum lag length and 𝛽𝑘 is a constant or 
weights that add to zero.  
In calculating the output loss, the study employed the (Ghosh 
& Wolf, 1994) model which shows the cost of each individual 
country when it relinquishes monetary policy autonomy to adopt a 
common currency. According to Sato and Zhang (2005), it is a 
highly simplified model that enables one to empirically assess the 
cost of forming a currency union. 
A critical assumption is that nominal wages are rigid to 
establish the benefits of an autonomous monetary policy. Prior to 
the adoption of a common currency, member countries use their 
sovereign policies to control economic activities and maintain full 
employment under the assumption of wage rigidity. But a monetary 
union uses a common policy to avert a union’s shock which is in 
function of individual countries’ shocks. Since the monetary union’s 
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shock is not unique to all member countries, the common policy may 
not likely cause individual countries to achieve full employment  
(Cheung & Yuen, 2005). Hence, this will induce a cost (output cost) 
of joining a monetary union. In analysing the output loss function of 
a currency union, (Ghosh & Wolf, 1994) assumed that nominal 
wage of each country is rigidly downwards. 
Let a country’s output at time t be given as follows: 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜃𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡
𝛼                                                                                              (𝟑) 
Where 𝜃𝑡 is a productivity shock, 𝑙𝑡 is labour employed in 
period t, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is the labour share. The real wage is equal 
to the marginal product of labour. Since the nominal wage rate 𝑤𝑡, 
is downward sticky and depends on previous year’s information, t-
1, it implies that: 
log(𝑤𝑡) = log(𝐸𝑡−1𝑃𝑡) + log(𝛼) + 𝐸𝑡−1𝜃𝑡 + (𝛼 − 1) log(𝑙)̅     (𝟒) 
Where, 𝑃𝑡 is the price level, and 𝐸𝑡−1 is the expectation 
operator based on previous years information t-1. 𝑙 ̅ is the 
equilibrium employment level. Thus, simulating the above two 
equations Gosh and Wolf arrived at the final expected output loss 
function as: 
𝐿𝑡 = [1 − exp(𝜀𝑡 − 𝜀𝑡
0) 𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)⁄ ]                                                  (𝟓) 
Where 𝜀𝑡 denotes the productivity stock to individual 
countries, 𝜀𝑡
0  is union’s shock, 𝛼 is labour share and 𝜀𝑡 < 𝜀𝑡
0. 
To ensure that the result is robust, two alternative shocks 
𝜀𝑡 to individual economies will be evaluated in the model - shock 
generated from BK filter will be captured as GDP-weighted average 
of individual country’s shocks. Lastly, the value of the labour share 
parameter 𝛼 is between the range 0.3 and 0.7 as defined by Gosh 
and Wolf, and adopted by (Cheung & Yuen, 2005; Sato & Zhang, 
2006; Maboreke, 2011). 
Annual data for real GDP growth rates from 1975 to 2015 
for 14 ECOWAS countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo were extracted from 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Liberia was excluded from 
the study due to paucity of data.  
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4. Results and Discussions  
The NOCA theory stresses on the importance of the benefits of a 
monetary union even though the shocks may originate from 
heterogenous sources for each country. Cheung and Yuen (2005) 
argue that a common stabilization policy is effective in tackling and 
fine-tuning economic activities only when shocks are asymmetric, 
and national business cycles synchronize.  
 Therefore, the analysis of business cycles to know whether 
a currency union will be beneficial to ECOWAS economies is 
important. For national real business cycles (RBC) to synchronize, 
there must be a correlation between trend (permanent) and cyclical 
(transitory) components of real GDP growth.  
The correlations representing the business cycle 
synchornization of West Africa States are shown in figure 1. It is 
evident here that economies in ECOWAS are not able to maintain 
steady growth. The trend component of RBC of Gambia, Mali and 
Senegal are not significantly different from zero. Among these 
countries, Mali has not been able to grow because it  suffered from 
severe security and political crisis (2012 coup d’etat) linked to the 
attacks by armed groups in the north of the country (Malian 
Economic Update, 2013), which constrained economic activities in 
the country. There was apparent growth between 1990 and 1997 in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and and Togo, because they 
experienced a currency devaluation. 
However, the negative and significant growth movement of 
Cote d’Ivoire is due to serious political and economic instability. 
Ghana and Niger experienced a consistent positive growth between 
1980 and 1986. Nigeria experiences both positive and negative 
shocks. There was falling trend in 1990, rising trend between 2000 
and 2005 and again falling between 2006 to 2009 because of global 
financial crisis.  
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Figure 1: Baxter-King Filters of GDP Growth Rates for 
ECOWAS Countries 
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Source: BK Filter using Eviews 9.5. 
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4.1. Stability of West African Monetary Union Using Output 
Loss Function 
West African States must be prepared to sacrifice their monetary 
policy autonomy and conduct a common stabilization policy for the 
region, if they really want to proceed to a currency union. However, 
to pursue a common stabilization policy, the output variations of 
member economies should be similar or have symmetric shocks. It, 
therefore, implies that countries with very high output variations 
will compromise the stability of the union and at the same time; 
increase the cost of managing a broader monetary union. 
To figure out the particular countries that might compromise 
the stability of the union, the output loss function introduced by 
(Ghosh & Wolf, 1994) is used to assess the cost of joining a currency 
union and pursuing a common stabilization policy. The identified 
supply shocks are calculated from the output loss function derived 
from the Baxter-King filter. Cheung and Yuen (2005); Sato and 
Zhang (2006) considered the weighted average GDP of each 
country’s shocks to represent the total shock to the union, while 
(Cheung & Yuen, 2005) used the average GDP of each country’s 
shocks to obtain similar results. For simplicity, the average GDP 
was adopted for this study in line with (Cheung & Yuen, 2005). A 
specific labour share parameter α ranging from 0.3 - 0.7 is assigned 
to each economy in line with other studies (Cheung & Yuen, 2005; 
Sato & Zhang, 2006). 
Table 1 provides the average percentage output losses with 
different labour shares for ECOWAS economies based on the 
simple average currency union’s shock. The results indicate that 
higher parameters of α, are associated with higher percentage output 
losses in case a monetary union is formed. This implies that the 
stability of the union will be compromised if the output losses of 
ECOWAS countries increase with time. 
The results also show that smaller economies will incur more 
cost if they join the West African monetary union because they have 
the highest and consistent output losses for all the parameters of α. 
For instance, Sierra Leone (0.81, 0.28), Gambia (0.80, 0.26), Mali 
(0.80, 0.26) and Cape Verde (0.78, 0.25) when α is 0.7 and 0.3 
respectively. The implication of this finding is that these countries 
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will compromise the envisaged common stabilization policy of the 
entire region. With the exception of Mali, the output losses of 
WAEMU sub-set economies are consistently higher and fall within 
the same range i.e., (0.73 to 0.77, α = 0.7), (0.6 to 0.64, α = 0.6), 
(0.45 to 0.47, α = 0.5), (0.31 to 0.34, α = 0.4), and (0.21 to 0.24, α = 
0.3) respectively. This justifies the fact that countries in a monetary 
union display similar patterns as already established from business 
cycle analysis. Again, this may be due to the common stabilization 
policy currently being pursued by all WAEMU countries. Of all the 
ECOWAS countries, only Nigeria and Ghana have relatively low 
output losses, consistent for all α parameters. Therefore, based on 
this analytical technique, only these two countries may be 
considered as prospective candidates for a monetary union because 
the cost of losing their monetary autonomy will be lesser. 
However, the output losses for ECOWAS countries are 
relatively higher compared to a group of Asian countries using the 
same technique and Baxter-King filter. Considering three Asian 
countries (China, Japan and Korea) for example, Cheung and Yuen 
(2005) had established that the output losses for Korea are 1.315 (α 
= 0.7) and 0.249 (α = 0.3) respectively making it a poor candidate 
for a currency union with Japan and China. On the other hand, China 
and Japan had relatively low output losses. For instance, the values 
of China range from 0.03 (α = 0.3), three times smaller than that of 
Ghana and Nigeria to 0.318 (α = 0.7), two times smaller than Ghana 
and Nigeria. The values of Japan range from 0.059 (α = 0.3), 
approximately 6 times smaller than that of  Ghana and Nigeria to 
0.164 (α = 0.7), four times smaller than  that of Ghana and Nigeria. 
These values suggest that even Ghana and Nigeria with relatively 
low output losses compared to other ECOWAS countries are still 
not yet good candidates for a monetary union.  
Furthermore, Ghosh and Wolf (1994) discovered that the 
losses in terms of the foregone macroeconomic stabilization policies 
for CFA countries are significantly higher than the corresponding 
costs for the US, European countries and even the G-7 countries. 
Sato and Zhang (2006) found that the output losses for smaller 
economies like Hong Kong and Taiwan compared to China are 
higher. There is a consistency in the above findings,  justifying the 
fact that smaller economies in a monetary union will incur higher 
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costs if they pursue a common stabilization policy. Hence, the 
stability of the envisaged ECOWAS monetary union will be 
undermined if member countries proceed as a group because the 
overall costs will seriously out-weigh the potential benefits. 
Table 1: Average Output Losses of ECOWAS Countries 
    Average Shock (%)  
  α = 0.7 α = 0.6 α =  0.5 α = 0.4 α = 0.3 
Benin 0.76 0.60 0.46 0.34 0.23 
Burkina Faso 0.73 0.57 0.43 0.31 0.21 
Cape Verde 0.78 0.63 0.48 0.35 0.25 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.77 0.61 0.47 0.34 0.24 
Gambia 0.80 0.64 0.49 0.36 0.26 
Ghana 0.61 0.46 0.33 0.24 0.16 
Guinea 0.77 0.61 0.47 0.34 0.24 
Guinea Bissau 0.75 0.59 0.45 0.33 0.23 
Mali 0.80 0.64 0.50 0.37 0.26 
Niger 0.76 0.60 0.46 0.34 0.23 
Nigeria 0.64 0.48 0.35 0.25 0.17 
Senegal 0.73 0.57 0.43 0.32 0.22 
Sierra Leone 0.81 0.65 0.51 0.39 0.28 
Togo 0.77 0.61 0.47 0.34 0.24 
   Source: Author’s computation derived from Baxter-King Filter 
5. Conclusions 
ECOWAS countries are committed to forming a broader monetary 
union between WAMZ and WAEMU by the year 2020, yet business 
cycles across the entire region have remained weak and non-
synchronous which may likely threaten the stability of the envisaged 
union. This study investigated the viability of a stable monetary 
union in the ECOWAS region. The study used the Golsh-Welsh 
Output Loss Function after de-trending the annual growth rates of 
the real GDP series from 1975 to 2015, using Baxter-King filter 
approach.  
The results indicate that smaller economies in the region 
(Cape Verde, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Mali) will compromise the 
stability of the union because their cost of pursuing a common 
stabilization policy will be very high, while larger economies 
(Nigeria and Ghana) will incur relatively low cost compared to the 
other groups. Also, the output losses of WAEMU economies fall 
within a particular range and are relatively lower compared to that 
of smaller economies in the region probably because they pursue a 
common stabilization policy. The implication of these findings is 
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that the stability of the envisaged ECOWAS monetary union is 
likely to be compromised, since smaller economies in the region will 
be worse-off than larger economies. Thus, smaller economies in the 
ECOWAS region should not be admitted into the monetary union 
for now, since they will compromise the union’s stability. This 
recommendation signals to ECOWAS that the stability of the Euro 
zone was compromised because of admittance of unstable 
economies into the European monetary union that failed to meet  the 
optimum currency area criteria. 
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